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One of the more fascinating aspects of vision research is the way the human visual system reacts
and adapts in conditions where everything goes a bit wrong. I remember being captivated as an
undergraduate by how deficits such as akinetopsia and cerebral colour blindness not only provide
us with insight into how normally functioning brains work, but also how they force us to rethink
our ideas about how we perceive the world. The rather unassuming and general title of McCloskey's
book belies this fact. Through a somewhat serendipitous series of events, McCloskey had the
good fortune to come into contact with AH, a student who presented a rather peculiar visual
deficitöshe was unable to accurately perceive the orientations and locations of visual stimuli.
For example, when asked to draw a giraffe facing rightwards, she would draw it facing leftwards.
Similar deficits occurred in her spelling, but what McCloskey claims makes her deficit all the
more intriguing is the fact that AH remained largely unaware that anything was wrong.
Visual Reflections is split into two parts. The first part contains a collection of previously
published and unpublished studies, and presents an exhaustive list of tests that AH undertook
over a four-year period. Whilst the results of these tests are initially interesting, after chapter after
chapter on specific aspects of AH's deficit the reader starts to feel as though the story is a little
repetitive. Moreover, one can't help but feel a little cheated out of some of the allure of this
case come chapter 8, wherein the author attempts to resolve the paradox of how, given the quite
obvious problems she encountered in spelling and drawing, AH was `` entirely unaware of her
perceptual deficit'' (as previously noted on page 5). It transpires during the chapter that this
statement is perhaps not entirely accurateö``AH, her parents, and her teachers did recognise that
she had significant problems in a variety of domains, although they failed to identify the underlying
cause of the problems'' (page 83).Whilst this is perhaps a minor point, after reading this I couldn't
help but feel a little disheartened that some of the magic of this case had been lost.
The second part of the book concentrates on the potential theoretical interpretations of
AH's deficitöspecifically in regard to how the human visual system deals with spatial repre-
sentation and frames of reference. McCloskey begins with an outline of the frame-of-reference
problem, arguing that there are two key questions about the representation of locations. These
concern what locations are defined in relation to (the `definition' question), and in what form
locations are represented (the `format' question). McCloskey goes on to argue that these two
questions are distinct from one another, and that this distinction is not readily apparent from
the cognitive and neuroscientific literature on the subject. Whether or not you agree with this
assertion, McCloskey does an admirable job of outlining why it is necessary to think of the two
questions as separate, and makes reasonable attempts to answer them using the results of AH's
experiments.
Ultimately, McCloskey's goal in the latter part of the book is to outline a framework for a
new theory of multiple visual subsystems, which is then pitched against two prominent theories,
Ungerleider and Mishkin's `` what ^where'' hypothesis (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982) and Milner
and Goodale's `` vision-for-perception/vision-for-action'' hypothesis (Milner and Goodale 1995).
McCloskey argues instead for transient and sustained visual subsystems that are in some ways
analogous to (and argued to draw on information from) early magnocellular and parvocellular
pathways. Where the results from the extensive testing of AH fit well with this new hypothesis,
McCloskey argues that they pose challenges for the what ^where and perception ^ action viewpoints.
McCloskey should be commended for his attempts to generate a new way of thinking about
visual subsystems. He proposes an intriguing model that provides a neat framework for a large
body of future work. However, one caveat to remember is that, as McCloskey admits himself,
it is a model based heavily on data from a single-case study. AH's deficit is a developmental
one, not acquired, and as such it seems reasonable to raise the question of how generalisable
her results are to normal populations. To his credit, McCloskey does not attempt to sidestep this
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issue; instead, hitting it head-on in the concluding chapter. Indeed, it is quite clear from the latter
half of the book that such counters to the author's claims have been well-considered, and are dealt
with in a refreshingly constructive manner.
Overall, then, Visual Reflections provides an extremely comprehensive account of a uniquely
intriguing single-case study and is quite an enjoyable read, particularly in the second half of the
book. For anyone interested in the oddities of the human visual system, and what we can learn from
developmental case studies, this book would certainly be a welcome addition to the vision bookshelf.
Peter Etchells, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TU, UK;
e-mail: Peter.Etchells@bristol.ac.uk
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A `Theory of Mind' is an understanding of the mind ^world distinction and appreciation that
behaviour can be driven by beliefs, which may differ from observable reality (Bartsch and Wellman
1989; Lewis and Mitchell 1994; Wellman and Bartsch 1988). Having a theory of mind enables
individuals to understand their own and others' behaviour, to predict how people will act in given
circumstances, to manipulate the behaviour of others, and function in a social environment.
This capacity is fundamental to our ability to act as social beings and consequently has attracted
a bewildering flood of empirical research, theory, and counter-theory over the last 20 odd years.
Martin Doherty's review of the field from the perspective of developmental psychology is a timely,
coherent, and concise overview of the types of research that have been conducted to date. He
presents the evidence for Perner's `Representational Understanding of Mind' model (RUM) (Perner
1991; 1995) in a manner that sets out the nuances of this elegant but complex argument in clear
detail and illuminates those areas where contention remains. In keeping with the remit of its publisher,
Psychology Press, the book is pitched well for an undergraduate audience, covering the basics as well
as offering insights that will be of interest to all those working in the field at any level. In the course
of delineating the evidence for RUM, Doherty describes the variety of ways that the question of
when and how Theory of Mind (ToM) develops has been tackled, and rigorously questions many
of the assumptions that have slipped into the literature. Specifically, and of note for readers of
Perception, he suggests that sophisticated perceptual processes may be sufficient to produce many
of the seemingly complex social behaviours observed in very young children and non-human
primates that have lead other researchers in the field to attribute advanced cognitive reasoning.
Doherty begins by setting his constraint of evidence for ToM as success on the standard false-
belief test in which a child shows evidence of understanding that other characters can hold false
beliefs that differ from reality yet none-the-less guide their behaviour. This point of view is not
without its critics (eg Bloom and German 2000), but at least limits the field to be addressed to just
those studies showing evidence of this sort. He then goes on to outline the three main competing
theories within the fieldöTheory Theory, Simulation Theory, and Modular Theory. My only real
disappointment with the book arose in this section as it seems a little understated. Theory Theory
is given extensive explanation, with pages of supporting empirical evidence why it is the favoured
theoretical framework. By comparison, the alternative Simulation Theory and Modular Theory are
given relatively little space and discussed in light only of counter-evidence (much of which is
outdated). Doherty concludes, weakly, that all three may play a role in ToM expression, but persists
for the rest of the book to pay them only lip service. Given the strength of his argument and the
evidence he presents for Theory Theory, I think the alternative theories could have been given a
fairer review at this stage while still maintaining Theory Theory's.
The remainder of the book is, for the most part, a description of all the evidence to support
Theory Theory, and specifically Perner's model of it, in a variety of associated research areas.
Chapters 4 and 5 look at developing skill in understanding other mental states and negotiating
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non-mental representations, chapters 6 and 7 look at pretence and gaze following as precursors
to ToM (ultimately discounting them), chapters 8 and 9 look at the interaction of executive
function and language development with ToM, and chapter 10 outlines alternative theories of the
role of a ToM deficit in autism. The strength of Doherty's book is its excellent and comprehen-
sive coverage of the evidence supporting RUM, and his descriptions of lower-level explanations
to argue against of the counter-evidence. In a literature that is becoming increasingly biologically
deterministic (as described by Carpendale and Lewis 2006), Doherty's book clearly points out a
number of assumptions that are frequently left unchallenged and under-addressed. While many
previous summaries of the literature assume such things as joint attention as a precursor to
ToM and a deficit of ToM as an explanation for autism, Doherty points out how inconclusive
the evidence for these sorts of assumptions may be and posits alternative explanations.
There is a strong tendency in both comparative and developmental psychology to interpret
complex behaviour in terms of high-level cognitive abilities, but Doherty throughout the book
curbs this movement by highlighting how the same capabilities could be brought about through
perceptual and statistical processing of the external information available. In this regard, the book
provides an ideal model of the theoretical cut and thrust involved in describing the development of
any cognitive ability on the basis of overt behaviour in psychological tests. For this reason alone the
book stands as an important addition to students of the field and, in comparison to many other
similar reviews on the market, will be of particular interest to readers of Perception.
Doherty delineates his area of interest wellöevidence in support of Theory Theory on false-
belief tasks and associated burgeoning capabilities. The areas he covers do not differ significantly
from those covered in reviews of the field 20 years ago (eg Astington et al 1988) suggesting
that, while techniques have improved, the primary questions remain unanswered. However, by
looking in depth at this section of the literature, he illuminates the crux of many of the conflicts
within it. As he points out, many of the controversies rest on how researchers define evidence
for implicit and explicit Theory of Mind capabilities. What does it mean to have an implicit
ToM? If it is not accessible then does it count? If implicit ToM exists, how does that reflect on
our theories of the development of explicit ToM? Once answers to these questions are agreed,
as in many areas within developmental psychology, the field will be better able to assess how the
variety of evidence fits with the range of theories.
The development of Theory of Mind has attracted so much empirical debate and contra-
dictory research that it is necessary at regular intervals to have someone provide an overview of
where we have got to. Doherty simplifies this process by taking a single theoretical standpoint
and presenting the research to-date from that perspective. This is a valuable contribution in
offering a straightforward outline of Perner's point of view, one of the dominant theories in the
field, and highlights many of the assumptions driving the field forward that need to be addressed.
As such, I would be delighted to recommend this book to my students with the caveat that they also
become acquainted with one of the many other reviews of the field that outline the alternative
theories in greater detail.
N L Gjersoe, Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TU, UK;
e-mail: N.L.Gjersoe@bristol.ac.uk
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